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Dear Mr'. Karps 
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Quite some time ago, it seems now, I iDlicated that 
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and I se1¥1 you a copy herewith. Actually its focus is perhaps 
somewhat limited, but I hope you fi1¥1 it useful. We intend to keep 
putting out articles in this field from tiae to time. 
With boa+ r•ao:rdo 

The European Community and the United 
States: Evolving Relations 
Allan S. Nanes and Reuben Efron 
IN IBE last days of its life, the 85th Congress gave its approval to the joint United States-Euratom research and power reactor 
program, in the legislation known as the Euratom Cooperation 
Act of 1958.1 This law provides that the United States will assist 
the European Atomic Community in attaining its goal of a total 
installed capacity of approximately 1 million kilowatts of electricity 
by December 31, 1963, by bringing into operation power plants 
using nuclear reactors. In addition, the legislation authorizes an 
initial appropriation of $3,000,000 for a cooperative research and 
development program, and provides for sale or lease to the Com-
munity of fissionable uranium 235 and one kilogram of plutonium. 
This law was implemented by the agreement for cooperation con-
taining provisions for financing, which entered into force on Feb-
ruary 18, 1959. This legislation marked the high point of Ameri-
can collaboration with the latest institution of the European Com-
munity. As such, it is a logical point of departure for recapitulating 
the current status of that Community and its relations with the 
United States. 
The treaties which set up the European Economic Community, 
popularly known as the Common Market, and the European 
Atomic Energy Community, popularly known as Euratom, were 
signed on March 25, 1957. The signatories were France, Italy, 
West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the 
familiar Six which have steadfastly carried the banner of European 
integration. Ratifications were deposited with the Italian govern-
ment, and the two Communities officially began operations on Jan-
uary 1, 1958. 
The effectuation of these treaties undoubtedly added an impe-
tus both to European integration and to closer cooperation among 
the states seeking to achieve it. Furthermore, states outside the 
Communities, particularly Great Britain, became ever more cogni-
zant of the economic benefits accruing from membership, and 
sought ways and means, if not to become actual members, at least 
1 Public Law 85-846, approved August 28, 1958. 
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to attain a greater measure of collaboration through the device of 
the free trade area. Concrete evidence of this could be found at 
the Paris meeting of the 17 members of the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) in October 1957. Under 
the leadership of Great Britain it was decided to begin immediate 
negotiations looking toward this end. 
The example of the Six gave evidence of enticing other nations 
to follow suit. Thus, on October 20, 1957, detailed plans for a 
"common Nordic market," including the pc>S&ble establishment of 
a customs union covering four-fifths of the trade between Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden were advanced. Under this project-
ed plan, tariffs would be abolished within Scandinavia, and a com-
mon Scandinavian tariff on imports from the outside would be 
imposed. These tentative plans were adopted after three years of 
deliberation by a special committee concerned with Scandinavian 
economic cooperation. 2 
These plans were made at a propitious time, for they coincided 
with Britain's desire to find some satisfactory arrangement for trad-
ing with the Common Market which would not compel severance 
of her Commonwealth ties. The Scandinavian countries, on their 
part, were happy with an arrangement which would strengthen 
their position vis a vis the Common Market and at the same time 
not impose the stringent restrictions on national trade policy which 
are inherent in the common market idea. The result was the crea-
tion of the so-called "Outer Seven," by the treaty signed in Stock-
holm on November 20, 1959, after prolonged negotiations. The 
members of this new group are Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. Under this "Outer Seven" 
treaty, the members pledge a 20% cut in tariffs on industrial goods 
to be effective July 1, 1960. In ten years it is planned to eliminate 
tariffs entirely. 3 This new association indicated it hoped to estab-
lish a link with the Common Market. Despite these protestations, 
a trade war definitely loomed at the beginning of 1960. The United 
States, however, moved to forestall this eventuality with the Dillon 
proposals, which will be discussed further on. At any rate the eco-
nomic community or association idea is growing, as attested by vir-
tually continuous discussion of a projected Latin-American trading 
2 N,w York Times, October 21, 1957, pp. 1, 11. 
a W11Sm111toa Post and Times Herald, November 21, 1959, B, p. 13. 
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community, either in the form of a common market or a free trade 
association. 
As for the European Communities themselves, there have been 
considerable. gains, both economic and political, since their inceir 
tion. A few basic figures illustrate how unified economic action 
can raise the Six to a level comparable with the two giants, the 
United States and the USSR, a height to which they could hardly 
aspire individually. Thus, in population, the European Community 
totals 165.8 million, in 1957-58 figures, as compared with 175.5 
million for the United States and 200.2 million for the Soviet 
Union. It ~s a labor force of 71.9 million, as compared with 
69 million for the United States and an estimated 100 million for 
RUS&a. Its gross national product, in 1955 dollars, was 125.5 bil-
lion, as compared with an estimated 135 billion for the Soviet 
Union, and 391. 7 billion for the United States. The annual ex-
ports, in 1956, far exceeded those of the Soviet Union, the ratio 
being 22.6 billion to 4.4 billion for the USSR ( at the official rate 
of exchange, 1 ruble = 25c), exclusive of the latter's trade with 
China and the satellites. It even exceeded the exports of the United 
States, which amounted to 20.8 billion. Steel production was 65.6 
million net tons in 1958, as compared with 86 million for the 
United States and 60.0 million for the USSR. The Six produced 
222.0 billion kilowatt hours of electric power in 1957, as compared 
with 715.7 billion kilowatt hours for the United States and 209.5 
billion kilowatt hours for Russia. This comparison takes on ad.ded 
significance when the small area of the Community, 449,000 square 
miles, is compared with the immense territory of the USSR totaJ,. 
ling 7,878,000 square miles, and the more modest but still vast 
United States with its 3,628,000 square miles.4 
The progress made by the Community is further illustrated by 
figures of trade in some of its products. The trade of these coun-
tries comprises 22% of the world total. In 1952, they sold 16.3 
million tons of hard coal. In 195 7 the figure had become 19. 7 mil-
lion, an increase of 21 %, Scrap iron trade showed a 175% in-
crease for the same period. Steel products traded increased 157%. 
Furthermore, for the first half of 1959, the first year in which the 
Common Market tariff :reductions were in effect, imports within 
' "Basic Facts About the European Community Members." Bulletin of the 
European Community for Coal and Steel. (Luxembourg, March-April, 1958), 
No. 29. See also, New York Times, January 13, 1959, p. ,4:9C. 
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the area were up 9.4% while exports rose 9.5%.5 At this juncture 
it may be well to point out that the machinery of the separate Com-
munities is now so closely enmeshed that the term "European 
Community" may perhaps be validly employed. The Council of 
Ministers, Assembly, and Court of Justice are now one and the 
same for all three Communities. 
The organizational complex, which is the result of this far-
reaching regional cooperation, is of particular significance in an-
other respect. That, of course, is supranationality, a principle 
which has been pushed to its furthest length in this instance. Su-
pranationality, as developed in the Community, and in predecessor 
functional agencies, simply means a legal concept according to 
which member states of an international organization mutually 
agree "to surrender their sovereignty in certain areas, but to retain 
it fully in others." 6 The departure which this principle represents 
from the usual mode of international cooperation is clearly exem-
plified by the statement of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations in his introduction to the Annual Report submitted to the 
12th session of the General Assembly. Discussing the role of the 
United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjold states, in part, as follows: 
"The Charter read as a whole does not endow the United Nations 
with any of the attributes of a super-State or of a body active. out-
side the framework of decisions of Member Governments. The 
United Nations is, rather, an instrument for negotiation among, 
and to some extent, for Governments." 7 
In this passage the Secretary-General indicated that the United 
Nations may serve only as an instrumentality assisting sovereign 
states in their negotiations and in the attainment of their goals. The 
European states, however, faced with economic and political prob-
lems of unprecedented dimensions, felt it necessary to adopt solu-
tions which exceeded this limited scope. They arrived at the con-
clusion that common salvation was better than individual pride and 
voluntarily accepted certain restrictions on their freedom of action 
for the sake of economic advancement and political strength. The 
5 New York Times, November 1, 1959, p. 6E. 
6 Reuben Efron and Allan S. Nanes, "The Emerging Concept of Supra-
nationality in Recent International Agreements," Kentucky Law Journal, 
XLIV, No. 2 (Winter 1956). 
1 Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work 
of the Organization, 16 June 1956-15 June 1957, General Assembly, Oflicial 
Records, Twelfth Session, Supp. No. lA (A/3594/Add. 1), p. 3. 
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result of this decision was the establishment of the various Euro-
pean Communities with what amounts to sovereign power in cer-
tain spheres of economic and political activity. 
The United States, in pursuance of its postwar policy of inter-
national cooperation and in its attempts to counter the expansionist 
designs of the Soviet Union, has wholeheartedly encouraged the 
movement for European integration. In so doing it displayed no 
hesitation arising from possible doubts over the implications of 
supranationality or from the fears of many businessmen that we 
were helping to create too powerful a competitor. Indeed, the ac-
tive financial and political support of the United States was neces-
sary before the Coal and Steel Community could be successfully 
launched. Euratom and the Common Market came into being 
with the official blessing of the United States. The Six nations 
making up the Community therefore had every reason to expect 
continuing American support and, in point of fact, had received 
concrete evidence of that support in loans advanced to the Coal 
and Steel Community and promises of fissionable materials to 
Euratom. In the same way the Community expected American 
support and understanding of its unique exercise of supranation-
ality. 
However, when Euratom sought to negotiate an agreement 
with the United States for fissionable materials and financial sup-
port for its program of joint atomic development, it ran up against 
several stumbling blocks. The first of these was the question of in-
spection. Pursuant to the President's 1953 "atoms for peace" 
declaration, the United States has negotiated about 40 bilateral 
agreements covering cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy. In each, with the major exceptions of those with Great 
Britain and Canada, the United States has insisted on unilateral 
inspection rights. What this means is that the United States rep-
resentatives are given the right to see that recipient countries do not 
divert to military uses fissionable materials from this country. When 
negotiations with Euratom were undertaken, America demanded 
the same provision. 
Euratom was jolted by the American position. It contended 
that in the original negotiations for its establishment, the members 
had been led to believe that American support for the Community 
encompassed consent to the latter's inspection system. In addition, 
there is the point truit the requirement of unilateral inspection is 
not uniform, as already mentioned. The agreement with Canada 
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contains only a guarantee that none of the transferred materials 
will be used for atomic weapons or any other military purpose. 
There is no inspection provided for at all. s That same condition 
obtains in the agreement with Great Britain, which also goes so far 
as to establish a mutual guarantee that neither party will use for 
military purposes equipment transferred under the agreement or 
transfer it to any party beyond its jurisdiction. 9 On the other hand, 
a typical agreement for cooperation in the atomic field, such as the 
one with France, provides for unilateral inspection by the United 
States of the proc~ing of nuclear materials made available by it.lo 
However, the United States cannot exercise a unilateral inspection 
function under the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, since it provides for inspection by the Agency itself.11 
In view of a provision such as this and those with Great Bri-
tain and Canada, American insistence on its own inspection rights 
constituted an unwarranted discrimination in the eyes of Euratom, 
and an infringement on its sovereignty, for it would render redun-
dant Euratom's own inspection system, which is an integral part of 
its supranational powers.12 
Finance provided the second stumbling block. The cost of build-
ing the power plants nec~ry to achieve Euratom's one million 
kilowatt goal by 1961 has been estimated at $350,000,000. The 
cost of purchasing nuclear fuel has been estimated at an additional 
$115 to $135 million, for a total of $465 to $485 million. This 
sum is more than Euratom can provide out of its own resources. 
Quite naturally, it expected the United States to help defray the 
cost of the construction program. These expectations have been 
realized in the Agreement for Cooperation, signed November 8, 
1958, under the terms of which the United States advanced a line 
s Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement between the 
United States and Canada, Washington, June 15, 1955. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series, 3304, Art. XI. 
e Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement between the 
United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
Washington, June 15, 1955. Treaties and Other International Acts Series, 
3321, Art. IX. 
10 Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement between the 
United States of America and France, Washington, June 19, 1956. Treaties 
and Other International Acts Series, 3689, Art. X. 
11 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Treaties and Other 
International Acts Series, 3873, October 26, 1956, Art. XII. 
12 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Art. 2 ( e) . 
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of credit totaling $135 million, through the Export-Import Bank, 
on August 27, 1959.13 
The problem of fuel cost still remains. As the Eutatom agree-
ment requires outright ownership by the Community of its uranium 
fuel, 14 which the Community must purchase abroad, once again 
it must tum to the United States as its largest supplier. However, 
since Euratom cannot afford to buy this fuel outright, any agree-
ment reached with the United States had to cover its financing. 
One proposal calling for the leasing of fuel to Euratom is impossible 
because the Euratom agreement forbids it. Under the formula 
finally adopted in the Agreement for Cooperation, Euratom will 
pay in cash for 21,000 kilograms of special nuclear material, while 
the initial operating inventory of 9,000 kilograms will be made 
available on a deferred payment basis. 
If the American position on inspection, as set forth above, was 
taken by Euratom as a retreat from all-out American support, a 
claim which we would not concede, the question still remains as 
to why such a seeming departure arose in the first place. Obviously, 
the chief difficulty lies in the stringent provisions of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, which restrict the interchange of atomic 
knowledge and materials. Canada and Great Britain, since they 
were in on the development of atomic energy from its wartime in-
ception, possess both atomic materials and know-how and can be 
considered as exceptions to the general rule because they have a 
quid pro quo which is of value to the United States. Neither Eu-
ratom nor its members can so qualify at this time. Furthermore, 
security controls seem to be IC$ rigid in these countries than in 
Britain and Canada, with greater :pos.sibilities for· the leakage of 
American-furnished infonnation and material to unauthorized 
quarters. Such considerations have undoubtedly motivated con-
gressional attitudes toward the exchange of atomic data and have 
influenced the negotiators of the Atomic Energy Commission. The 
more internationally-minded State Department has been prepared 
to take a greater risk in this connection if such a venture will help 
to achieve international inspection in the production of nuclear 
is Proposed Euratom Agreement ( with associated documents and ma-
terials). Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Congress, 2d Session. 
Committee Print. Appendix D. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., July 1958, 
52 p. See also, New York Times, Nov. 9, 1958, p. 1, and Bulletin from the 
European Community, October-November 1959. No. 38, p. 15. 
u Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Art. 2(£). 
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materials, America's prerequisite to any disarmament agreement. 
American policy toward Euratom has been predicated on two 
considerations. The first is to favor its development, as we have 
favored that of other European Communities, as a means of uni-
fying Western Europe, which is seen as a counterpoise of sufficient 
strength to resist Soviet expansionist aims. The underlying premise 
of this policy is the belief that Western Europe will continue to 
stand with the United States against Soviet expansion because its 
interests so dictate. The second consideration, also based on cold 
war objectives, is to advance the image of the United States as pri-
marily interested in developing atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 
Thus, "one apparent purpose of President Eisenhower's speech 
before the United Nations was to stress American interest in devel-
oping peaceful uses of atomic energy in order to change the foreign 
image of the United States as a country devoted primarily to the 
military uses of nuclear power." 15 
Nor should it be assumed that the exchange of atomic infor-
mation with Euratom constitutes a one-way street. "Because it rep-
resents a common effort by six countries already technically and 
industrially advanced, Euratom offers the possibility of important 
advantages to the United States which other programs cannot af-
ford to the same extent." 16 Some of these benefits include: first, 
a large market for American firms in an area controlled by our 
allies, and, second, return to the United States of information 
gained from Euratom's technological advances. Such information 
should be of ultimate benefit when we are ready to embark on a 
large-scale domestic nuclear power program in this country. 
In the inspection formula finally adopted in the Agreement for 
Cooperation, the United States returned to a position more con-
sistent with its original support of European unity. This formula 
comprises the abandonment by the United States of its insistence 
on unilateral inspection, in return for the agreement of Euratom 
to establish standards for its own inspection similar to those usu-
ally required by the United States in its bilateral agreements. Such 
a compromise should do much to bring about a "genuine partner-
ship" between the United States and Euratom which, as Knorr 
15 Klaus Knorr, "American Foreign Policy and the Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy." Atoms for Power (The American Assembly, Columbia Uni-
versity, New York, 1957), p. 101. 
16 Ben T. Moore, Euratom, The American Inter,st in the European Atomic 
Energy Community (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 39. 
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says, "will not come about or will not work well, unless the country 
is willing to treat those countries as real partners rather than as 
clients who are not to be fully trusted." 11 
However, the consent to accept Euratom inspection, laudable 
as it may be, is in apparent conflict with the principle of interna-
tional inspection. While this country accepted such inspection re-
luctantly, it nevertheless is a signatory to the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and as such is committed to it. 
Thus, the Administration was faced with a policy choice between 
alternatives each of which can commend themselves to men of good 
will. In choosing to support Euratom's claim to self-inspection, it 
could not help but undermine the position of the new International 
Atomic Energy Agency, for whose establishment the United States 
was to a large extent responsible, and contradict our advocacy of 
international inspection as a prerequisite to disarmament. But if 
it insisted upon international inspection of Euratom's activities, it 
would strike a serious blow at one of the promising European Com-
munities and at the whole concept of a federated Europe. 
Now, it may be urged that this contradiction is more apparent 
than real, because the treaties with Great Britain and Canada have 
already established a precedent for United States acceptance of a 
unilateral guarantee resting on the counterpart's inspection system, 
and because the International Atomic Energy Agency is in its in-
fancy and has not yet established its own effective international 
inspection. It may be urged that as Euratom's members become 
used to inspection by regional authority [Euratom itself], they 
should be more amenable to inspection by international authority 
at some later date. This argument has the virtue, from the Ameri-
can point of view, of justifying simultaneous support of European 
unity and international inspection. However, it is essentially an 
argument for the long run, and the decision had to be made in 
terms of a shorter range. Unquestionably it was not an easy deci-
sion to make. Perhaps, as a way out, the treaty with Euratom 
should have included a proviso that, when an effective inspection 
system is implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
both parties would be willing to renegotiate and submit themselves 
to that international inspection. 
Even before the cooperation act was passed, America's nego-
tiations with Euratom had furnished a lead for other countries. 
11 Knorr, op. cit., p. 127. 
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Great Britain had also proposed the negotiation of an agreement 
with Euratom for the peaceful development of atomic energy. is 
Euratom indicated in reply that it was ready to proceed with talks 
looking to that objective. In time such talks were held, consum-
mating in an Anglo-Euratom agreement, patterned after the agree-
ment with the United States, and signed on February 4, 1959. 
Great Britain, like the United States, has also established official 
diplomatic relations with Euratom. Both of these atomic leaders, 
in accrediting representatives to the European Atlantic Community, 
have given official recognition to its sovereign status. Following the 
lead of its two allies, Canada signed an agreement with Euratom 
on October 6, 1959, covering the exchange of information, materi-
als and equipment in the nuclear field. 
The favorable prospects for the continued development of the 
European Community were somewhat cast into the shadows by the 
uncertainties arising from the French political situation. Even be-
fore the accession of de Gaulle to power, the stringent French finan-
cial position had caused the Pflimlin government to give notice to 
its allies that France might not be able to implement its obligations 
under the Common Market nor negotiate further on a free trade 
area.19 Furthermore, it was thought that General de Gaulle's na-
tionalistic bias might cause France to be more reserved toward 
the policy of European unity. Before assuming office, de Gaulle 
declared that France would respect the obligations to which she 
had subscribed, although he had at various times criticized the modo 
which European unification had taken. He is also on record as 
favoring a confederation in Western Europe to which the members 
would delegate some portion of their sovereignty.2° Furthermore, 
in a policy statement to the National .A&<;embly on January 15, 
1959, Premier Michel Debre expressed full support for the Euro-
pean Communities: "Tlris government will encourage the High 
Authority in the effort it will undoubtedly have to make in con-
junction with the Atomic Energy Community, in order to develop 
the Continent's potential sources of energy." 2 1 The Premier also 
exhibited a similar positive attitude toward the Common Market. 
1s Euratom Information Service, Washington, D.C., Press Release, May 22, 
1958. 
19 Washington Post and Times Herald, May 31, 1958, pp. Al, A4. 
20 New York Times, June 1, 1958, p. E5. 
21 Ambassade De France, Service De Presse Et D'lnformation. Speeches 
and Press Conferences. No. 124B. January 15, 1959. 
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The continuance of French cooperation is further symbolized by 
the appointment of M. Etienne Hirsh, a close collaborator of Jean 
Monnet, to succeed M. Louis Armand as President of the Euratom 
Commis.sion. In view of this, and of the extent of France's commit-
ment to European functional union, the supporters of United Eu-
rope have reason to hope that such progress as has been made will 
not be swept away by the nationalist tides now surging in France, 
or by General de Gaulle's differences with NATO. Indeed, even 
the resignation of M. Pinay probably foreshadows no alteration in 
basic policy toward the European Communities. 
Finally, to fight the Soviet advance in the economic sphere re-
quires, in the opinion of some leading authorities, the encourage-
ment of regional economic groupings along the lines of the Euro-
pean Community.22 American policy involving areas outside of 
Continental Europe has not been crystallized. Moreover, the emer-
gence of the "Outer Seven" as a potential rival of the European 
Economic Community, has compelled the United States to elab-
orate a plan which goes beyond our previous benevolent but some-
what pas.sive role. At the Paris meeting held last January, Under-
secretary of State Dillon advanced proposals encompassing roughly 
the following: first, a new economic organization linking the United 
States and Canada to W estem Europe. This organization would 
supersede the O.E.E.C. It would aim to organize the free world 
market and liberalize trade beyond the achievements of G.A.T.T. 
Presumably, such an organization would eliminate the possibility 
of any trade war between the "Outer Seven" and the "Inner Six." 
What is more, it should reduce discrimination against our trade at 
a time when sufficient dollars are available abroad and our balance 
of trade is unfavorable. 
A second objective of these proposals would be to increase the 
amount of aid to underdeveloped countries by providing such aid 
on an international scale. Thus, the European beneficiaries of the 
Marshall Plan would invest some of their surplus capital in the 
underdeveloped areas. Presumably this effort would be adminis-
tered in some unified fashion and thus give a European as well as 
an American aspect to such aid. Certainly the advent of a partner 
to help bear the aid burden is a development virtually all Ameri-
cans would welcome. 
22 See Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century (Rockefeller 
Brothers Fund, Special Studies Project, New York, 1958). 
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The Dillon proposals are notable in that they go beyond the 
somewhat sentimental attitude toward European unity that we have 
exhibited heretofore. They represent an attempt to broaden the 
purely economic point of view into an approach that considers 
European organization from the standpoint of the long range politi-
cal interests of the West. Such a course has been recommended by 
Walter Lippmann,23 among others. Of course, in an election year 
implementation of these proposals may be held in abeyance. 
In conclusion, we may be confident that continued support for 
European unity will be a mainspring of American policy. The 
Dillion proposals and their generally favorable reception indicate 
that America is likely to assume an active role in promoting this 
unity and shaping it to the ends of a more broadly conceived West-
em policy. 
zs Washington Post and Times Herald, January 14, 1960, p. A 23. 


